Reconnaissance By Fire And Shooting And South Africa And Reconnaissance And PdfBy Molly L. In and pdf 18.05.2021 at 05:36 8 min read
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- Reconnaissance vehicle
- Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat
- Reconnaissance vehicle
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This article considers the use and evolution of air power during the First World War. By focusing on the principal air power roles — control of the air, tactical, strategic, and naval and maritime aviation — the article acknowledges the national, strategic, and operational contexts in which air power came to develop between and ; very often within and influenced by existing military and naval organisations.
Although aviation was in an embryonic state during the conflict, war in and from the air became an increasingly visible and important aspect of the First World War.
The emergence of heavier-than-air flight in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War presaged the change in the character of warfare that appeared between and Yet, as John H. Morrow Jr. This view raises a fundamental question about the evolution and effect air power had on the conduct of the First World War: did the First World War do more for air power than air power did for the conflict?
However, in many respects, aviation was an emerging technology, and all thinking on its application was, in , experimental. Nevertheless, by the end of , three of the four principal air power roles identifiable in modern doctrine can be recognised. The final role of air mobility in a nascent form would eventually appear by As such, this article examines the role of air power in the First World War covering the critical areas of control of the air, tactical air power, strategic bombing, and naval and maritime air power.
The term tactical air power refers to the application of military aviation in support of ground forces through the provision of ISR — observation and reconnaissance — and offensive action against ground targets.
The use of such a capability was applicable to both offensive and defensive operations during the First World War. Before , it was recognised that air assets could provide a distinct advantage on the battlefield. The use of lighter-than-air platforms in the 19 th century laid the foundation for the use of air power in the observation and reconnaissance roles, while the emergence of heavier-than-air flight added the further advantage of ever increasing speed.
The pre-war militaries of Europe and even less powerful European countries did not ignore the potential benefits provided by air power. For example, air assets were used to limited effect during the Italo-Turkish War of and the Balkan Wars of and While there is some evidence that the pre-war officer classes of European militaries had reservations about the use of air power, the establishment of air arms by the major powers to support their armies illustrates that, in a limited sense, aviation was viewed as a valuable addition to existing capabilities.
In , air power, with varying degrees of success, provided intelligence via reconnaissance and observation, which provided situational awareness to ground commanders. At the Battle of the Marne, both French and German aviators provided prompt if uneven support.
Some French and British officers were reluctant to use aeroplanes, while organisational issues caused challenges for the Germans. This was reinforced by developments in aerial photography that continued to evolve in Additionally, the use of offensive air power to support ground forces also began to appear around the time of the First Battle of Ypres. As operations moved into , air power became increasingly crucial to the planning and conduct of the land battles.
In addition to aeroplanes, balloons were an important platform for observation by all sides because their static nature meant that observers became familiar with the terrain they surveyed and focused on the process of artillery support. They were, however, limited by the field of vision and became a prime target for fighters trying to restrict the situational awareness of the enemy.
On the Eastern Front , reconnaissance and observation were necessary, though the geographic scope of the theatre made it a challenging process. In the latter role, they were used to undertake long-range reconnaissance operations to track German troop movements. However, it was on the Western Front that crucial developments occurred. Developments in photography by both the French and British eventually led to the provision of image-based assessments that, through the production of photo mosaics, mapped artillery positions and allowed pre-planned registration of guns.
For the British, tactical support via observation was enhanced by the development of the clock code system of directing artillery fire, which mapped and corrected the fall of shot. In the RFC, contact patrols appeared as a response to the problem identified in of maintaining contact with forward troops, as communications could be easily cut due to artillery fire.
Thus, it was necessary to find a means to allow rear headquarters to communicate with forward troops and vice versa; aeroplanes offered that capability.
Derived from operational experience as well as learning from French experiences, contact patrols became the principal method of communication at the forward edge of the battlefield. German aviators highlighted similar issues, and one of the key problems was that ground forces were often reluctant to identify their positions to aeroplanes for fear that it would identify them to opposing artillery. Improvements emerged and as the war continued, specialised contact patrol methods were developed to work with cavalry and tanks.
The German army also codified its experience with contact patrols in its manual on Der Infanterieflieger und der Infanterieballon Infantry Airplane and Infantry Balloon. Beyond providing timely situational awareness to commanders and ground troops alike, air power became increasingly involved in providing kinetic support to the land battle.
This included direct battlefield support, or close air support, and interdiction, or the use of air power to isolate or destroy forces at the operational level. In , the air arms of the various combatant nations experimented in different ways concerning bombing military objectives, primarily enemy troops. French operations in highlight an interesting tension between the bombing of tactical and strategic targets. While the latter is discussed in further detail below, it is worth stressing that units involved in bombing, as opposed to ground attack, could, and did, attack both tactical and strategic targets.
For example, French units coming from the Belfort region in struck both German cities and airfields depending on conditions. Indeed, as the air war took on a progressively strategic dimension, GBAD became ever more important in the battle for control of the air over the battlefield and home fronts. Other challenges existed, however. In both the application of air power at the tactical and strategic levels, navigation also remained challenging, especially at night.
However, wartime developments, such as the British development of signalling lighthouses, began to ease this issue as the war progressed.
Concerning bombing, another difficulty was accuracy. The development of bombsights, such as the Michelin bombsight used by the French, increased accuracy. A final issue was the impact of bombing, and the British noted that towards the end of their activities on the Western Front did not produce the material effect desired.
Nevertheless, bombing continued to form an essential element of operations by all sides throughout the war. At the tactical level during the Battle of the Somme , the RFC, by this time commanded by Major-General Hugh Trenchard — , dropped 13, bombs during the first four days of the battle, though post-war German analysis questioned the effectiveness of some of this effort. Similarly, on the Eastern Front bombing was recognised to be a useful adjunct to Russian operations and, for example, was used on the Southwestern Front; however, overall, air-ground cooperation remained difficult for the Russians.
A fundamental change emerged by , when ground attack was added to the repertoire of the air arms. This development was based on experience gained during where aeroplanes had been used to strafe ground targets.
Furthermore, for the British, as their contact patrols developed to include co-operation with tanks, offensive action against anti-tank guns became necessary. At a technological level, Germany developed a series of innovative aeroplanes that could be utilised at low levels. Both the British and French principally relied on fighter designs, though by the end of the war the RAF had introduced a dedicated ground attack aeroplane, the Sopwith Salamander.
By , despite challenges, air power was being widely employed to support land campaigns and regularly provided efficient situational awareness to ground forces as well as bombing and ground attack operations. It should also be noted that, despite the separate thematic treatment of the control of the air and tactical air power, the two were synonymous and Allied success in applying tactical air power to the land battle in cannot be separated from the fight for control of the air.
Without achieving a degree of air superiority, the Allies could not have applied the full weight of their air resources in such battles as Amiens and Saint-Mihiel. Air power, from the strategic through to the tactical, was and remains an inter-connected domain, where a change in one area can influence the other.
Nevertheless, the thinking and language used to describe control of the air can be traced to various sources, including science-fiction literature and naval thinking.
Moreover, thinking about control of the air was influenced by the wider strategic, operational, tactical, and cultural priorities of the parent organisations to which the air arms belonged. The early months of the First World War illustrated the importance of control of the air as it became apparent that it could deliver tactical and operational benefits to commanders. Control of the air created freedom of action for tactical assets employed in reconnaissance and artillery spotting.
As air arms moved into , the importance of controlling the air crystallised. By June , the RFC was issuing regular operational orders relating to the need to contest airspace. Technology was important in the development of ideas and practices relating to the control of the air. The appearance in of the Fokker Eindecker , a fighting aeroplane with a synchronised machine gun capable of firing through the propeller arc, saw a significant increase in losses for the British and a corresponding impact on RFC morale.
This aeroplane was credited with ending German air ascendancy in this period of the war. Furthermore, concentrating air assets into specialised units allowed for better command and control at the decisive point. Additionally, as air arms increased in size, there was a need to create the necessary higher organisations with the essential support structures such as logistics networks.
At the operational level, in the French introduced the Division Aerienne Aerial Division that was comprised of both bombers and fighters and allowed for the flexible use of air power, as it was not linked to a specific field army and could be redeployed to any point of the front to support operations.
As the war moved into and the battle for control of the air swung back and forth, it was clear that achieving and maintaining this state was based on superior tactical, technological or doctrinal innovation.
Both the battles of Verdun and the Somme saw the large-scale use of air power in support of the land battle, but more importantly, the massing of fighter units to achieve control of the air. At Verdun, German aviators had hoped to control the air by amassing fighters to allow their observation aeroplanes freedom of movement; however, the French responded with a concentration of fighter units that no longer operated in close quarters with their observation counterparts.
Instead, they were tasked to operate in combat air patrols searching out German aeroplanes. Via the coalition context, the British readily learnt from the French experience at Verdun, which shaped their conduct of the air campaign over the Somme.
During this campaign, the RFC took to the offensive, and while the British possessed technically superior fighters, it was the way such aeroplanes were used that helped the British dominate the airspace over and around the battlefield. Thus, during and , German aviation came to concentrate air assets at time-specific and geographically important locations to contest the control of the air, a situation compounded by the industrial superiority of the Allies.
In turn, German air policy and practice came to rely on quality over quantity in the battle for the control of the air, illustrated by the introduction of the Fokker DVII. The defining characteristic of aerial combat during this period was its complex, attritional and industrial character. By , meaningful opportunities for individual sorties across the lines were gone.
The changing character of air warfare also had an impact on logistics and training. However, it was not without its challenges, and the ability to gain and maintain control of the air was inherently linked to tactical, strategic, doctrinal, and industrial developments, as developments on the Italian front illustrated. From the Battle of Piave in June through to the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in October and November , the Italians, with British and French support, achieved control of the air through the combined means of offensive-counter air operations OCA on Austro-Hungarian airfields while also contesting for air superiority.
Importantly, rather than being a partner, Germany dominated Austria-Hungary. Lacking in this regard, Austria-Hungary could not compete for control of the air.
The origins of strategic bombing were found in the pre period, and the development and proliferation in Germany of rigid airships did much to focus military and non-military theorists on the potential for air power to achieve a strategic effect.
On entering the conflict, the Royal Navy looked to neutralise German air assets capable of striking Britain by launching an OCA campaign against airship sheds at the end of Demonstrating the link between strategic air power and control of the air, these operations sought to limit the potential for strategic raids against Britain.
Nevertheless, the Royal Navy continued to use bombing to limit German naval operations by attacking their capability at its source.
These operations illustrate the threat and counter-threat character of air operations. Furthermore, bombing by Royal Navy air assets went beyond just those with direct military objectives. The formation of No.
However, these objectives were deemed legitimate as they linked to naval production, thus extending the concept that attacking at the source was more efficient than seeking direct battle.
Both France and Italy conducted bombing operations, and in the case of the former, they were the first nation to create a dedicated bombing unit Groupe de Bombardement 1.
It has been suggested that French operations illustrated a degree of restraint, though this was more for pragmatic and geographical reasons than for any significant moral or ethical objections.
Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks against Persons Hors de Combat
The helicopters form part of No. The helicopters have been delivered and were to be fitted with the Mokopa ZT-6 anti-tank missile. A production order for the Mokopa was placed in March Delays with the development of the missile meant significant delays in integrating with the Rooivalk. The cockpits are in stepped tandem configuration. The weapon systems officer WSO is seated in the front cockpit and the pilot is seated in the cockpit above and behind the WSO. The cockpits, which are fitted with crashworthy seats and are armour-protected, are equipped with hands-on collective And stick HOCAS controls.
This article considers the use and evolution of air power during the First World War. By focusing on the principal air power roles — control of the air, tactical, strategic, and naval and maritime aviation — the article acknowledges the national, strategic, and operational contexts in which air power came to develop between and ; very often within and influenced by existing military and naval organisations. Although aviation was in an embryonic state during the conflict, war in and from the air became an increasingly visible and important aspect of the First World War. The emergence of heavier-than-air flight in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War presaged the change in the character of warfare that appeared between and Yet, as John H.
Walker, the author of "At the Hurricane's Eye: U. Jason McCarthy, a Special Forces soldier, had no idea that he would be a businessman running a So then I'm at rock bottom and couldn't reasonably make a good decision for the life of me. These activities include offensive raids, demolitions, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and counterterrorism. Does the etiology of the condition matter?. The Finer Things in Life: Photo.
rounds per minute— rate of fire. RHAe BRM-1K Armored Recon Command Vehicle . BRM-3K Combat Loader Type: Autoloader gun rounds; manual for gun and ATGMs vehicles can range up to mm (South African Rooikat).
Recently, the world witnessed a significant increase in the number of used drones, with a global and continuous rise in the demand for their multi-purpose applications. However, recently, the malicious use of drones began to emerge among criminals and cyber-criminals alike. The probability and frequency of these attacks are both high and their impact can be very dangerous with devastating effects. Therefore, the need for detective, protective and preventive counter-measures is highly required. The aim of this survey is to investigate the emerging threats of using drones in cyber-attacks, along the countermeasures to thwart these attacks.
For many years the standard armoured car of the South African Defence Force was the Daimler Ferret , which was developed in the late s and armed with a single general-purpose machine gun. In , South Africa accordingly secured a similar platform with a much wider range of armament installations: the French Panhard AML. One hundred AMLs were purchased, presumably for preliminary evaluation purposes, as well as enough turrets, engines, and other associated parts for the later assembly of another in South Africa. Sandock VAs initially fared rather poorly; all 56 models furbished in were rejected by the South African Army. An extensive rebuild programme followed - the Panhards were returned to the manufacturer, completely disassembled, restructured, and trialled again.
A reconnaissance vehicle , also known as a scout vehicle , is a military vehicle used for forward reconnaissance. Both tracked and wheeled reconnaissance vehicles are in service. In some nations, light tanks such as the M Sheridan and AMX have also been used by scout platoons.
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Rheinmetall Mission Master
The Union brought together the defeated independent Boer republics and British colonies. The Afrikaner National Party held power at some point - , but it was largely managed by entering into a coalition with the Labour Party first and later the Unionist Party and South Africa Party. As a result of these coalitions, the party was not strong enough to unilaterally pursue its domestic and foreign policies. While the presence of MK has been covered in detail in some countries eg Angola and Lesotho , SAHO is currently developing material on those African countries that have not been covered. The growth of Afrikaner nationalism reached its momentum after the Second World War. This was shown during the Second World War when Afrikaner people were split between the pro-German and pro-British lobby.
You may recommend changes to this manual to improve it. Key your comments to the page mainly Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin. America. Generally, observation and fields-of-fire are less restricted in Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Security Operations. guided missile because the tank gun can better fire.